The two Boeing 737 MAX disasters killed 346 people and exposed failures extending far beyond a single software system. Now, a newly examined flight-management software defect is renewing questions about whether Boeing and federal regulators have fully absorbed the lessons of those tragedies.
In a 20-page ASX Research analysis, aviation safety researcher Albert N. Clark examines a defect affecting vertical navigation (VNAV) during certain missed-approach sequences on affected 737 MAX aircraft. The issue is not equivalent to the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) failures associated with the crashes. It nevertheless raises a consequential question: when software behaves incorrectly, how much additional responsibility should be transferred to pilots?
The Lessons of 346 Deaths
Lion Air Flight 610 crashed on October 29, 2018, killing 189 people. Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed on March 10, 2019, killing another 157. Subsequent investigations identified failures involving aircraft design, automation, certification, corporate decision-making, and assumptions about pilot response.
MCAS could command stabilizer movement based on erroneous information from a single angle-of-attack sensor. Pilots had not been adequately informed about the system, while certification assessments assumed crews would recognize and respond to failures more effectively than events demonstrated.
The research argues that the resulting catastrophe was systemic, involving both Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
A Different Software Problem, a Familiar Question
The newer defect involves flight-management software that can cause VNAV to disengage during a particular missed-approach sequence. According to the study, the FAA determined that the condition did not prevent continued certification work because pilots retained aircraft control and received clear indications.
That conclusion is materially different from declaring the defect nonexistent.
A missed approach can already involve rapidly changing aircraft configuration, air traffic control instructions, navigation demands, weather, fuel considerations, and diversion decisions. Restoring lost automation functionality may impose additional tasks precisely when crew attention is most valuable.
The analysis does not claim that the VNAV defect will cause another MAX accident. Instead, it challenges the assumption that an aircraft remaining controllable necessarily means the operational consequences of an automation failure are insignificant.
When Pilots Become the Backup System
The research identifies a recurring safety concern: an engineering deficiency may be considered acceptable because trained pilots can compensate through procedures.
But that reasoning depends on what else is happening in the cockpit.
A crew dealing with an unexpected automation change may simultaneously be managing weather, aircraft performance, radio communications, and an abnormal flight situation. Additional workload can reduce the capacity available to respond to another problem.
The central question is therefore not simply whether pilots can manage the defect. It is whether they should be expected to carry avoidable workload when a permanent software correction is available or being developed.
Boeing’s Accountability Problem
The study also examines Boeing’s response to the MAX disasters and the federal government’s efforts to hold the company accountable.
Boeing entered a deferred prosecution agreement in 2021 after being charged with conspiracy to defraud the United States. The Justice Department subsequently determined that Boeing had breached that agreement. A proposed guilty plea was later replaced by a non-prosecution agreement, and the corporate criminal charge was dismissed in November 2025.
The resulting financial obligations were substantial. Yet the criminal case did not culminate in a corporate conviction or a criminal conviction of a senior Boeing executive connected to the MAX certification scandal.
Clark examines the broader institutional problem created when a corporation is simultaneously a major commercial manufacturer, defense contractor, employer, political participant, and subject of federal regulation.
The paper discusses Boeing’s political contributions, lobbying, and major military-aircraft contracts. It explicitly finds no credible evidence establishing that Boeing purchased favorable prosecutorial treatment or defense-contract awards through political contributions. Its concern is instead the structural dependence between Boeing and the government institutions responsible for regulating, prosecuting, and purchasing from the company.
The Standard After 346 Deaths
The research concludes that Boeing’s strategic importance does not eliminate the need for independent oversight, engineering accountability, and meaningful scrutiny of procedural workarounds.
It also recognizes an essential distinction: the absence of a criminal conviction is not proof of wrongdoing by any particular executive, but neither does it resolve every documented question about corporate responsibility.
For flight crews, the practical issue is more immediate. A missed approach should not become more complicated because an avoidable software deficiency remains unresolved.
The study’s final argument is straightforward: if Boeing knows how to eliminate a defect, correcting it should take priority over asking another flight crew to manage the residual risk.
Read the complete 20-page ASX Research paper: 346 Dead – and Boeing Is Still Asking Pilots to Work Around the Software — ASX Research Journal and Database, October 4, 2026.